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Abstract
In this article, we investigate the eect of environmental policy on economic growth
using an R&D-based growth model with endogenous labour supply. A government
implements a pollution permit as environmental policy. As a result, we conduct a
numerical analysis and nd that a decrease in pollution permit levels positively eects
economic growth.
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1 Introduction
Recently, environmental pollution has signicantly aected economic activities worldwide.
The economic cost of air pollution such as the cost of particulate matter (PM) has been
extensively reported by the OECD (2014). Air pollution in China is particularly serious.
Serious air pollution such as PM-10 forces China to abstain from outdoor economic activities
and diminishes labour productivity because of sickness caused by air pollution.1
When discussing a relation between environment policy and economic growth in an en-
dogenous growth model, researchers often discuss the growth eect from environmental poli-
cies.2 For example, Bovenberg and Smulders (1995) nd that an environmental tax has a
positive growth eect by considering the positive externality of environmental quality. By
using the variety expansion model of Romer (1990), Grimaud (1999) shows that a decrease
in pollution permit levels has a negative growth eect. In contrast, Ono (2002) shows that
a decrease in pollution permit levels has a negative growth eect. Considering the creative
destruction model of Aghion and Howitt (1992), Nakada (2004) nds that an environmental
tax has a positive growth eect. Although we do not reach any consistent conclusion, the
previous works show that a decrease in pollution permit levels has a growth-degenerating
eect.
Researchers argue that an endogenous labour supply claries the growth-enhancing eect
of an environmental policy. Hettich (1998) shows that an environmental tax has a growth-
enhancing eect in a Uzawa-Lucas model with endogenous labour supply. This is because
leisure time that is decreased by an environmental tax increases study time and boosts
economic growth. Using a learning by doing model, Itaya (2008) shows that the growth-
enhancing eect from an environmental tax exists when an indeterminacy of equilibrium
occurs. Although the author shows that a labour supply increase from an environmental
1For example, Hanna and Oliva (2011) and Yang et al. (2013) argue that pollution reduces labour supply,
and Gra Zivin and Neidell (2011) argue that pollution decreases worker productivity.
2Ricci (2007) is a recent survey that introduces theoretical papers on growth-enhancing eects from
environmental policies.
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policy stimulates growth rates, no study analyzes the growth eect from a reduction in
pollution permit levels in an R&D model. This paper attempts such an analysis.
The model in this study is based on the variety expansion model by Romer (1990). We
consider a pollution permit an environmental policy. We conduct a numerical analysis and
nd that a decrease in the pollution permit levels can have a positive eect on economic
growth. Additionally, we present a numerical example where the environmental policy has a
positive eect on welfare.
The present paper is composed of the following sections. Section 2 shows the dynamic
general equilibrium model. We investigate the stability of the dynamic system in Section 3.
Section 4 depicts an eect of environmental policy on economic growth and welfare. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider an economy that consists of a representative household, a nal good sector,
an intermediate good sector, and an R&D sector. Perfect competition exists in the nal
good sector. The nal good is produced by employing labour and intermediate goods. The
pollution ow is produced using capital stock. The level of pollution ow can be reduced
using an abatement good produced by the nal good. The intermediate good rms produce
the intermediate goods using capital from household rents. The rms in the R&D sector
employ labour to produce new designs. The number of households is normalized to one and
lives innitely in the economy. The population is normalized to one. While the household
who supplies labour acquires a positive utility from consumption and leisure, the household
suers from the negative externalities of pollution.
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2.1 Final good sector
Following Gradus and Smulders (1993), we assume that net pollution ow is produced by
the following mechanism:
Pt =
R At
0
xj;tdj
Zt
; (1)
where
R At
0
xj;tdj  Kt represents aggregate stock of physical capital, Zt is an abatement good,
xj;t is a quantity of intermediate good j, and At is a number of intermediate goods. While
the net pollution ow increases by using the aggregate stock of physical capital, the ow
decreases by employing the abatement good produced from the nal good.3
To internalize the negative environmental externalities, the government implements an
environmental policy of pollution permits. We explain the market for the pollution permit.
The government distributes quotas for permits to the rms ( P ) in each period. The rms
freely trade the distributed quotas in the competitive pollution permit market. The unit
price of the pollution permit is denoted by pet . The rms that emit pollution in excess of the
pollution permit (Pt > P ) using the intermediate good must purchase the pollution permit of
(Pt  P > 0) in the market at the price pet . On the other hand, the rms that emit pollution
under the pollution permit (Pt < P ) by employing the abatement good can sell the pollution
permit of ( P   Pt > 0) in the market at the price pet . The pollution permit market must be
cleared.
The nal good is produced by the following production function:
Yt = L
1 
Y;t
Z At
0
xj;tdj; 0 <  < 1; (2)
where Yt is the output of nal goods. We employ the nal good as the numeraire good. LY;t
is labour input. The nal good rms choose their inputs, taking the factor prices as given.
Thus, the nal good rms maximize the following:
3In the present model, reducing the level of pollution permit decreases pollution by employing the abate-
ment good as an end-of-pipe technology.
3
max
LY;t;xj;t;Zt
t = Yt   wtLY;t  
Z At
0
pj;txj;tdj   Zt   pet (Pt   P );
where wt is a wage rate in the nal good sector, pj;t is the price of the intermediate good j,
pet is the price of the pollution permit, and P is the permit quotas given to a rm in each
period. The rst order conditions of prot maximization are given by:
wt = (1  )
 R At
0
xj;tdj
LY;t
!
; (3)
pj;t +
pet
Zt
= 

LY;t
xj;t
1 
; (4)
1 =
pet
Zt
R At
0
xj;tdj
Zt
; (5)
where (3), (4) and (5) state that the rms hire labour, the intermediate goods i and the
abatement good until their marginal products are equal to their factor prices.
2.2 Intermediate good sector
Each intermediate good rm is a monopoly rm. The rms buy designs from the R&D sector
by paying the xed-cost investment and maximize their prots by taking the inverse demand
function for their intermediate good as given. The variable costs are the interest costs. Thus,
the rms maximize the following:
max
xj;t
j;t = pj;txj;t   rtxj;t;
s:t pj;t = 

LY;t
xj;t
1 
 

1
Pt

:
The rst order conditions of prot maximization are given by
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pt =
1


rt +
1  
Pt

; (6)
t =
1  


rt +
1
Pt

xt: (7)
The quantity of the intermediate good x is determined by substituting the price into the
inverse demand function for the intermediate good j. Therefore, the prices and the output
level of all intermediate goods rms become the same.
2.3 R&D sector
A new variety of intermediate good is developed by the following technology:
_At = AtLA;t; (8)
where At is the stock of the variety's intermediate good, LA;t is labour input and  > 0 is a
parameter of productivity. PAt is the price of a new design. A perfect competition prevails
in the R&D sector. Thus, free entry into the R&D sector results in the following:
PA;tAt = wt: (9)
2.4 Household
The representative household maximizes the following:
Ut =
Z 1
0
[ logCt + (1  ) log lt   P logPt] e tdt; (10)
where Ct is consumption, lt is leisure time, 0 <  < 1 represents the weight on the utility
attached to consumption and leisure , p > 0 shows the weight on the utility attached to
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pollution, and  > 0 is a subjective rate of time preference.
The budget constraint is
_Wt = rtWt + wt (LY;t + LA;t)  Ct; (11)
where Wt is a nancial asset held by the household. The time constraint is
1 = LY;t + LA;t + lt: (12)
The household maximizes (10) by choosing a consumption stream and an allocation of
time between leisure and labor supply. The rst order conditions become

Ct
= t; (13)
1  
lt
= wtt; (14)
  _t + t = rtt; (15)
lim
T!1
TWT e
 T = 0; (16)
where t is the shadow price of assets, and (16) is the transversality condition. Substituting
(13) into (14), we obtain the following:
wt =
1  

Ct
lt
; (17)
where (17) states that a marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is
equal to the wage rate. From (13) and (15), we obtain the following Euler equation:
6
_Ct
Ct
= rt   : (18)
2.5 Market
The economy is composed of the pollution permit market, the labour market, the capital
market, the stock market and the good markets. In equilibrium, the pollution emitted by the
nal good rms coincides with the pollution permits distributed by the government(Pt = P ).
The labour market is cleared(1 = LY;t+LA;t+lt). Because each intermediate good rm holding
the patent rents capital from households, we obtain the following equilibrium condition for
the capital market:
Z At
0
xj;tdj = Kt , Atxt = Kt: (19)
The no-arbitrage equation is the following:
t + _PAt
PA;t
= rt: (20)
Finally, in the good market, the following holds:
Yt = Ct + _Kt + Zt: (21)
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3 Equilibrium
3.1 Dynamic system
By dening two jump variables (yt  Yt=Kt, zt  Ct=Kt) and one state variable (!t  Kt=At),
we obtain the following dynamic system:
_yt
yt
=
1  


1
P

+ yt
1
1 !t   2yt

; (22)
_!t
!t
= yt   zt  

1
P

  

1  yt 11 !t   1  
(1  )yt

1 !tzt

; (23)
_zt
zt
= zt   (1  2)yt   : (24)
Appendix A shows their derivations.
3.2 Steady state
The steady state is determined by _yt = _!t = _zt = 0. Then, we obtain the following steady
state:
!( P ) =
2y( P )  1= P
y( P )
1
1 
;
z( P ) = (1  2)y( P ) + ;
y( P ) =

2(1 + )

 +
   
(1  )+
1 + 
 P
+D( P )

;
D( P ) 
"
 +
   
(1  )+
1 + 
 P
2
+
4(1 + )(1  )
2(1  ) P
# 1
2
:
We show the derivation of steady state in Appendix B. In the steady state, the leisure time
and the labour times spent in the nal good sector and in the R&D sector become
8
l( P ) =
1  
(1  )y
( P )

1 !( P )z( P );
LY ( P ) = y
( P )
1
1 !( P );
LA( P ) = 1  y( P )
1
1 !( P )  1  
(1  )y
( P )

1 !( P )z( P ):
We show their derivations in Appendix B. In a steady state, the growth rate becomes
g( P ) = 2y( P )  1P   : (25)
Appendix B shows the derivation of growth rate.
3.3 Stability
By linearizing the dynamic system around the steady state (y; !; z), we obtain the following
linearized system:
0BBBB@
_yt
_!t
_zt
1CCCCA =
0BBBB@
2y   1
 P
(1  )y 2 1  0
J21 J22  ! + 1 (1 )

  1
 Py

!
 (1  2)z 0 z
1CCCCA
0BBBB@
yt   y
!t   !
zt   z
1CCCCA ;
where J21 and J22 are
J21 = !
 +
!
1  

  1
 Py

1 +
(1  )z
(1  )y

; J22 = y
   1
 P
+
1  
(1  )

  1
 Py

z:
We apply the Routh-Hurwitz theorem:
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Theorem 1 (Routh-Hurwitz Theorem)
The number of roots with positive real parts involved in the characteristic equation is equal
to the number of variations in the sign of the scheme:
 1; trJ; BJ + detJ
trJ
; detJ:
To check the stability, we obtain the following signs of trJ and detJ :
trJ > 0 and detJ < 0:
We show their derivations in Appendix C. Because trJ > 0 and detJ < 0 hold, the eigenvalues
of the Jacobi matrix have one stable root and two unstable roots. Hence, the steady state is
locally saddle-point stable.
4 Comparative statics
In this section, we numerically investigate how changes in the pollution permit levels aect
the growth rate and welfare.
4.1 The eect of environmental policy on the growth rate
By following De Hek (1999) and Oueslati (2002), we set the following parameters:  =
0:25;  = 0:8;  = 0:01 and  = 0:5. Using their parameters, we present a decreases in P as
a growth eect. Figure 1 to 7 show the results. Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 4 and Figure 6
reveal that decreases in P have a positive eect on y, z, LY , and LA. Figure 3 and Figure
5 reveal that decreases in P have a negative eect on ! and l. Thus, Figure 7 shows that
decreases in P have a positive eect on the growth rate.
[Inserted Figure.1-8]
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These results are explained by the following. If P declines, the nal good rms must employ
the abatement good to conserve pollution. The increases in the abatement good raise the
price of the intermediate good and the monopoly prot rises(See (7)). This increases the
dividend per stock and the demand for a new design. The demand for labour from the R&D
sector also increases along with the sector wage rates. Hence, the households supply labour
to the rms in the R&D sector. Finally, the decreases in P stimulate R&D activity and boost
the growth rate.
4.2 The eect of environmental policy on welfare
We investigate numerically the eects of a decrease in pollution permit levels on the welfare
level of the steady state. Our welfare measure is (10). By substituting Ct = z
( P )K0egt and
(25) in (10), we rewrite (10) as follows:
Ut( P ) =
 log z( P )
t
+ 
 
g( P )   t logK0 + 1  
t
log l( P )  P
t
log P : (26)
The terms from rst to third show the indirect eect of a decrease in P on the welfare level
through consumption, the growth rate, and leisure. The fourth term shows the direct eect
of a decrease in P on the welfare level. By following De Hek (1999) and Ouealati (2002), we
show the welfare eect using the following parameters:  = 0:25;  = 0:8;  = 0:01;  =
0:5; P = 0:140974. We assume K0 = A0 = t = 10. The result is presented in Figure 8.
4
Figure 8 presents the following numerical example: a reduction in pollution permit levels has
a positive eect on welfare.
4U( P ) is negative when P > 14:38 holds.
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5 Conclusion
We considered the eect of an environmental policy on economic growth in an R&D-based
growth model with endogenous labour supply. Then, we analyzed how a reduction pollution
permit levels aects the growth rate and welfare. As the result of analysis, we conduct a
numerical analysis and nd that a decrease pollution permit levels has a positive eect on the
economic growth rate. Moreover, we presented a numerical example where environmental
policy has a positive eect on welfare.
Appendix
A The derivation of the dynamic system
Using (1) and Pt = P , we rewrite (5) as the following:
pet
Zt
=
ZtR At
0
xj;tdj
=
1
P
: (A. 1)
Using (A. 1), we rewrite (4) as the following equation:
pt = 

LY;t
xj;t
1 
  1P : (A. 2)
Substituting (A. 2) into (6), we obtain the following:


LY;t
xj;t
1 
  1P =
1


rt +
1  
P

, rt

= L1 Y;t

At
Kt
1 
  1
 P
, rt = 2yt   1P :
(A. 3)
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Using (A. 3) and (7), we obtain the following:
t = (1  )yt!t: (A. 4)
We rewrite (3) as the following:
wt = (1  ) Yt
LY;t
: (A. 5)
Substituting (A. 5) into (9), we obtain the following:
PA;tAt = (1  )yt Kt
LY;t
: (A. 6)
We rewrite Yt = Kt
(AtLY;t)
1  as the following:
yt =

AtLY;t
Kt
1 
, yt 11  1
At
=
LY;t
Kt
, Kt
LY;t
= yt
  1
1 At: (A. 7)
Substituting (A. 7) into (A. 6), we obtain the following:
PA;tAt = (1  )yt1  11 At , yt = [(1  )(PA;t) 1] 1  : (A. 8)
Using !t = (Kt)=(At), we rewrite yt = [(AtLY;t)=(Kt)]
1  as the following:
yt =

LY;t
!t
1 
, LY;t = yt 11 !t: (A. 9)
Substituting (A. 3) and (A. 4) to (20), we obtain the following:
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_PA;t
PA;t
= rt   t
PA;t
,
_PA;t
PA;t
= 2yt  

1
P

  (1  )yt!t
PA;t
: (A. 10)
Substituting (A. 8) into (A. 10), we obtain the following:
_PA;t
PA;t
= 2yt  

1
P

  yt 11 !t: (A. 11)
Using the time derivative of (A. 8), the following holds:

1  
_yt
yt
=  
_PA;t
PA;t
: (A. 12)
We obtain (22) by substituting (A. 11) into (A. 12).
Using (1) and Pt = P , we rewrite (21) as the following:
_Kt
Kt
= yt   zt  

1
P

: (A. 13)
Substituting (9) into (17), we obtain the following:
PA;tAt =
1  

Ct
lt
, lt = 1  

Ct
Kt
Kt
At
1
PA;t
, lt = 1  
(1  )yt

1 !tzt: (A. 14)
Using (12), (A. 7) and (A. 14), we rewrite (8) as the following:
_At
At
= 

1  yt 11 !t   1  
(1  )yt

1 !tzt

: (A. 15)
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We obtain (23) using (A. 13) and (A. 15).
Substituting (A. 3) into (18), we obtain the following:
_Ct
Ct
= 2yt  

1
P

  : (A. 16)
We obtain (24) using (A. 13) and (A. 16).
B The derivation of steady state and growth rate
The steady-state is determined by _yt = _!t = _zt = 0. Using (22), we obtain !
( P ). Using (24),
we also obtain z( P ). By substituting !( P ) and z( P ) into (23), we obtain the following
equation:
f(y)  (1 + )

y2  

 +
(   )
(1  ) +
1 + 
 P

y   (1  )
(1  ) P = 0 (A. 17)
(A. 17) is a quadratic equation of y( P ). By solving (A. 17), we obtain a positive
solution(y( P ) > 0) and a negative solution(y( P ) < 0). We choose the positive solution(y( P ) >
0) as the solution of (A. 17). Then, we obtain the following solution:
y( P ) =

2(1 + )

 +
   
(1  )+
1 + 
 P
+D( P )

; (A. 18)
D( P ) 
"
 +
   
(1  )+
1 + 
 P
2
+
4(1 + )(1  )
2(1  ) P
# 1
2
: (A. 19)
Using (18) and (A. 3), we obtain (25).
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C Proof on the signs of the trace and the determinant
of the Jacobian matrix
Using (A. 3) and !, we obtain the following equations: y
1
1 !   (1   )y = 2y  
1=( P ), y
1
1 ! = y 1=( P ) and y 1 ! =  1=( Py). We use these equations to
calculate the Jacobian matrix. By calculating trJ = J11+ J22+ J33, we obtain the following:
trJ = 2y  

1
 P

+ y  

1
 P

+
1  
(1  )

  1
 Py

z + z: (A. 20)
Using (A. 3) and z, we rewrite (A. 20) as the following:
trJ =
(1 + )r

+
(1  )r
(1  )
(1  2)y + 
y
 

2y   1P

  1


y   1P

+ : (A. 21)
We rewrite (A. 3) as the following equation:r = 2y 1= P , r+(1 )y = y 1= P .
By substituting this equation into (A. 21), we obtain the following:
trJ =
2r

+
(1  )r
(1  )
(1  2)y + 
y
+ + (1  )y > 0:
Then, we obtain trJ > 0.
By calculating detJ = J11J22J33 + J12J23J31   J12J21J33, we obtain the following:
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detJ =z

2y   1
 P

y   1
 P

+
1  
(1  )

  1
 Py

z

+ (1  2)(1  )z!y 2 1 

1  1  
(1  )

  1
 Py

  (1  )z!y 2 1 

1 +
1
1  

  1
 Py

1 +
(1  )z
(1  )y

: (A. 22)
Using 

y
1
1 ! = 2y   1= P = r=, we rewrite (A. 22) as the following:
detJ =z

2y   1
P

r
2
+
1  
(1  )
zr
y

  (1  )y
zr


2 +
(1 + )(1  )r
y
+
r
(1  )y +
(1  )rz
(1  )2y2

: (A. 23)
Rewriting (A. 23), we obtain the following:
detJ =  1 + 
 P

r

+
(1  )zr
(1  )y

  (1  )z
r2
2
  (1  )yzr   (1  )(1  
2)r2z
2
< 0:
Then, we obtain detJ < 0.
We obtain BJ by calculating BJ = J11J22 + J12J21 + J12J23 + J22J33. By proving detJ <
0 < trJ , we conclude that the eigenvalues of the Jacobi matrix have one stable root and two
unstable roots. Thus, we do not show BJ.
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Figure 1: y( P ) Figure 2: z( P )
Figure 3: !( P ) Figure 4: LY ( P )
Figure 5: l( P ) Figure 6: LA( P )
Figure 7: g( P ) Figure 8: U( P )
Note:  = 0:25;  = 0:8;  = 0:01;  = 0:5;
P = 0:140974; K0 = A0 = t = 10.
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